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What do a Mongolian stir-fry restaurant and a medical lab providing home testing solutions have in common?
They are both innovative services that base their success on customers controlling part of the service delivery.
These providers allow service tasks to be performed by the customers as a means of shaping the overall
experience and not strictly as a means of “outsourcing” the service. Motivated by such practices, we explore
whether and how should providers allocate the control of different tasks of their service to the customers. We
model services as multi-step processes with each step affecting customers’ experience at other steps. At certain
steps the provider may hold an “expert” role and be more capable of performing than the customers, whereas
at other steps she holds an “administrative” role and is less capable of performing than the customers. We
distinguish between routine services, where the service outcome must conform to standardized specifications,
and non-routine services, where the value of the service outcome relies on subjective dimensions. We show
that the optimal design is determined by an economically intuitive rule whereby the provider controls the
steps based on the marginal benefit she can derive compared to self-service. For routine services, this rule
translates to managing “blocks” of steps because the provider benefits from containing the volatility of the
experiences across the service even when this implies the provision of service steps with a negative marginal
benefit, i.e., steps which she is less capable of performing than the customers. Instead, in non-routine services
providers should focus on the value advantage they can ensure through a “core provision” even if this implies
forgoing control of steps for which they are more capable of performing than the customers and from which
they can derive positive marginal benefit. This implies that in non-routine services the provider exercises
more control up to a certain process length; beyond that she delegates more steps to the customers. When
customers differ in their abilities to perform the different steps, the provider may offer a service line. Service
lines facilitate better segmentation than a single service offering, but their economic benefit exhibits an
inverted “U-shaped” relationship with respect to the number of steps that a service comprises. Finally, we
find that competition between two providers who differ in their capabilities to perform a service results in
service design differentiation where the more capable provider offers a higher-end “focused service” against
a lower-end “super-service” offered from the less capable provider.
Key words : customer experience, service process, service line design, service competition
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1. Introduction
Customer engagement during service delivery has been long recognized as a “mixed bless-
ing” for service providers (Sasser 1976). On the positive side, customers can be an indirect
source of labor that results in cost savings, but on the negative side, they may also intro-
duce variability because they may interact with the provider in complex and uncertain
ways. Advances in technology have helped providers to capitalize on the positive side. For
instance, self-checkout terminals have allowed providers to capture non-negligible opera-
tional cost savings. However, viewing customer involvement as merely a cost-saving strat-
egy is rather limiting and often results in poorer service outcomes (Moon and Frei 2000).
The reason is that such involvement rarely results in immediate benefits for the customer,
who, let us not forget, exerts the effort (Frei and Morriss 2012). Building on this obser-
vation, we posit that whether a service task is controlled by the customer or the service
provider, is not strictly a means of achieving operational cost savings. Instead, it offers a
means of shaping the overall customer experience. Recent examples of innovative services
indicate how customer involvement is an opportunity to create customer value:
Dining Services. In midtown Toronto, Canada, Genghis Khan Mongolian Grill encour-
ages their customers to be creative and enjoy their own food creation. In particular,
customers choose from a wide variety of ingredients and prepare a combination of their
own inspiration. Then, they let the chefs assume the cooking responsibility. This ser-
vice blueprint lies in contrast to that of another equally unconventional restaurant: the
Gaslamp’s Steak Place in San Diego, CA. This well-known Californian steak lounge lets
the customers grill their own selection of steak and thereby delegates the food preparation
responsibility to them. Several miles away, in San Francisco, CA, Eatsa only prepares the
food and delegates the rest of the service tasks to their customers. Eatsa’s customers select
and place their orders on touchscreen tablet computers, and proceed to wait before a wall
of glass cubbies. Once their order is ready, it is placed in one of the cubbies which light
up with the name of the customer, who then picks up the order. Finally, Blue Apron’s
online service controls all tasks except for cooking. It selects the food ingredients, provides
recipes/cooking instructions, and delivers everything to the customer who then assumes
the cooking responsibility at their own space.
Healthcare Services. Testing the blood sugar levels of a diabetic patient no longer
requires a visit to the doctor or the lab. Most patients can easily obtain and use self-test kits
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(WebMD 2018). More interestingly though, new services allow for customers to exercise
similar control over testing, even for conditions that require more complicated specimen
analysis. For instance, Cologuard (specializing on the detection of colon cancer) or myLab
Box (specializing on the detection of sexually transmitted diseases) allow customers to
be tested for different health conditions by mailing their samples to the provider’s lab.
Similarly, the customers of SmileDirectClub initially submit an online photo assessment
of their dental structure. After a licensed dental professional reviews this assessment, the
customer receives a kit with instructions on how to create his dental impressions. These
impressions are mailed to the provider, and the lab creates the customized dental aligners
which are then shipped to the customer. Throughout the treatment, the customer regularly
uploads pictures so that the provider monitors the overall progress.
These diverse examples showcase how the customer’s role can be leveraged in practice
by innovative service providers. The same examples also reveal that determining how to
manage this role is far from a straightforward decision. Even in similar contexts (e.g.,
dining services), different providers implement different designs when it comes to enabling
customer control over various service tasks. The differences stem from the challenges asso-
ciated with the customers’ involvement in service delivery. For instance, not all customers
have the same abilities to perform the different tasks (e.g., cooking) of a service process.
Such heterogeneity can create a tension as low-ability customers may prefer to relinquish
control of the service tasks to the provider, but high-ability customers may actually enjoy
exercising more control over the service tasks.
Regardless of their ability level and independently from the nature of the service, cus-
tomers may prefer to relinquish control if the provider can perform the service more reliably
than them. However, such reliability benefits may vanish if the provider control neces-
sitates more inter-personal interaction. For instance, explaining special meal or cooking
preferences to a waiter may result in a more variable experience than when the customer
picks and cooks his own selection of ingredients.1 Finally, the fact that services comprise
multiple tasks (i.e., service steps) implies that the experience that customers derive at one
service step may affect the experience they derive at other steps.
1 The higher experiential variability can also be attributed to “social frictions” during the interaction of a customer
and a service provider. For instance, a customer may feel that he is subject to negative social judgement when he
places a complicated request or even when he orders high-calorie food; see Goldfarb et al. (2015).
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In this paper, we answer the question of how providers should allocate the control of the
different service tasks to the customers. We consider a monopolist provider who decides
which steps of the service process to “delegate” to the customers. We define the value that
customers derive at each service step to comprise two parts: i) a functional (systemic)
part and ii) an idiosyncratic (emotional/experiential) part. The customer value realized
at the different steps might be correlated and the customers, all else being equal, prefer
less variable experiences. Furthermore, customers may differ in their ability to perform the
service steps.
The difference between the functional value that customers derive from a service step
when it is performed by the provider versus themselves defines the provider’s expertise
advantage at that step. In certain steps, the service provider has an “expert” role and is
more capable of delivery than the customers. At such steps, her expertise advantage is
positive, and the customers derive larger functional value when the provider controls the
steps. In other steps, the provider holds an “administrative” role and might be less capable
of satisfactory delivery. There, her expertise advantage is negative, and the customers
derive larger functional value from self-performance.
Which party controls a service step also affects the idiosyncratic part of the value derived
by the customer. In particular, the value contribution of the idiosyncratic part may increase
or decrease depending on the party that assumes responsibility for a service step. This
distinction between a higher or lower contribution from the idiosyncratic part finds an
intuitive conceptual mapping to the type of the service. We distinguish between routine
and non-routine services. In routine services, the value of the service outcome must conform
to standardized specifications, and in that context, a task delivered by the provider might
also ensure conformity (i.e., less variability). In non-routine services, the service outcome
is evaluated along more intangible dimensions, like subjective taste. Hence, if the customer
does not have direct control of a service step, this may amplify the variability of how he
evaluates the outcome of the step.
Our analysis characterizes a practical and economically intuitive rule that prioritizes
which steps should be controlled by the service provider based on their marginal benefit
to the provider. This benefit is determined by the extent to which the provider’s expertise
advantage at a service step outweighs the total cost of providing the step. Although this
rule is independent of the service context, the resulting optimal design differs significantly
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depending on the type of the service. In routine services, the provider prefers to “over-
control.” She controls even steps for which she is less capable of performing compared to
the customers; steps with a negative marginal benefit. This happens to ensure the overall
performance of the service outcome through less variability. On the contrary, in non-routine
services, the provider focuses focus only on the subset of steps for which she holds a clear
and sizeable expertise advantage forgoing steps with small but positive marginal benefit.
Through such designs, she ensures high outcome delivery while mitigating the possible
detrimental effects of variability across the service steps.
Furthermore, we investigate how service characteristics affect the provider’s optimal
design. For instance, in routine services, the provider controls more steps if the service
comprises a large number of steps. Yet, in non-routine services, this effect is non-linear.
The provider exercises more control for longer processes, but beyond a certain length, she
decreases the number of steps she controls. Regardless of the type of the service, however,
the provider always derives higher profit from services where her expertise advantage varies
significantly across the different service steps. Any differences in the provider’s expertise
advantage across the different steps stem from differences in the provider’s expertise, the
customers’ capability and/or the cost of the service steps. Hence, in practical terms, our
finding implies that all else being equal, the provider prefers service processes that comprise
dissimilar, in terms of cost or contribution to the customer value, steps.
Our paper also provides insights regarding the effect of heterogeneity in the customers’
capability to perform the different service steps. We consider the case where a service
provider covers the needs of a heterogeneous market by offering a service line with two dif-
ferent services. We find that the economic benefit of introducing a service line exhibits an
inverted “U-shaped” relationship with respect to the number of the service steps. Namely,
the economic benefit from offering a service line is less pronounced for services that com-
prise a small or large number of steps. Thus, for significant deployment costs (e.g., due
to acquiring new facilities and equipment, as is often the case because services cannot be
inventoried), a service line may be economically non-viable. Hence, the classic benefit of
better market segmentation due to a service line might be critically traded-off by charac-
teristics of the service such as its number of steps. This result is a novel insight beyond
the traditional outcomes of product line design.
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Via numerical methods, we also tease out the effect of competition on service design.
We consider the case of two competing providers who differ in their ability to perform
the service steps. Competition induces more differentiated service offerings: a “focused
service” where the high-capability provider exercises control of key service tasks only and
a “super-service” where the low-capability provider assumes control of a large number of
service tasks. Interestingly, although in a monopolistic setting a higher-capability provider
controls more service steps to capitalize on her expertise advantage throughout the service
process, under competition we find that the higher-capability provider limits her control
of the service process.
2. Literature Review
Our focus on customer involvement as a design decision echoes a growing literature stream,
which adopts the broader perspective of customers as value co-creators (Prahalad and
Ramaswamy 2000, Thomke and Von Hippel 2002). The primary focus of this stream,
however, has been on the design of tangible products (see Franke et al. 2010, Basu and
Bhaskaran 2018 and references therein), which due to their tangible nature, are charac-
terized by a smaller degree of uncertainty around the customer experience than services
(Zeithaml et al. 1985).
A recent stream of research has investigated the customers’ role in the delivery of services
and how it can be enabled by technology (Scherer et al. 2015). The focus of these studies
has been primarily on the technology-mediated interactions between customers and service
providers (Froehle and Roth 2004), taking place through the use of self-service technologies
(SSTs; see Buell et al. 2010, Campbell and Frei 2010, Ba et al. 2010, Kumar and Telang
2012). In this stream of research, the decision to engage the customer is based mainly on the
potential cost savings that typically ensue from the engagement of SSTs in specific steps of
the service process. Still, these papers do not account for the holistic customer experience
across all points of contact between the provider and the customer during the service
delivery. The customers’ role has also been examined in B2B service delivery contexts (e.g.,
consulting projects; see Xue and Field 2008, Roels et al. 2010, White and Badinelli 2012,
Karmarkar and Roels 2015, Demirezen et al. 2016). In such contexts, however, the design
decisions revolve mainly around the design of formal contractual agreements between a
client and a service provider.
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Our research is closer in spirit to the research of Soteriou and Hadjinicola (1999) and
Bellos and Kavadias (2017), who both consider services that comprise multiple steps. Sote-
riou and Hadjinicola (1999) focus on the optimal budget allocation across the service steps
but assume no dependence between steps. Bellos and Kavadias (2017) borrow the same
conceptual approach to service design as a follow-up to our study and determine the opti-
mal provider effort allocation across the different service steps. Neither of these papers
offers actual insights regarding which service steps should be performed by the customer.
Furthermore, both papers assume that customers are homogeneous and that the provider
always offers a single service.
Our paper offers a framework that analytically formalizes novel service design practices.
We contribute to the nascent field of service design by explicitly accounting for the multi-
stage nature of services, the inherent variability in the customer value, and the fact that
the customer value at one step may be affected by the value at a different step. Our
framework applies to a multitude of service contexts and prescribes design guidelines based
on a practical typology: that of, routine vs. non-routine services. Furthermore, we account
for the fact that the market may comprise customers with different abilities to engage
during the service delivery, and we analyze the provider’s incentives to design a line of
differentiated services. To our knowledge, this is the first paper to offer insights into the
design of service lines.
3. The Model
In this section, we introduce our model. A monopolist service provider determines the
optimal design of their offering: the price to charge and the steps of the service process to
control or delegate to the customers.
3.1. The Service Process
We formalize a service process as a set J = {1,2, . . . , n} of n distinct steps that aim to
satisfy a particular objective (e.g., diagnosis, treatment of a health condition) and generate
customer value. The value V˜ ei that customers derive at step i depends on the entity e ∈
{P,C} that performs it; P denotes the service provider and C the customer.
Formally, a service is defined by the vector D = (P,C) where the provider controls a
subset of steps P ⊆J and delegates the rest of them C =J \P to the customers. The exact
value that a customer realizes from service D is given by V˜ (D) = ∑
i∈P
V˜ Pi +
∑
i∈C
V˜ Ci . The
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first sum captures the value that a customer derives from the subset of steps controlled by
the service provider. The second sum expresses the value derived from the steps that the
customer performs.
Regardless of whether a step is performed by the customer (henceforth “he”) or the
service provider (henceforth “she”), the exact customer value cannot be predicted at the
stage where the design of the service takes place. For that reason, we define V˜ ei
.
= V ei + ε˜e,
where ε˜e follows a general probability distribution G (0, σ2e); V˜ ei is a random variable with
a mean V ei and variance σ
2
e . The distribution moments of the customer value carry very
intuitive meanings: the mean captures the functional part of the customer value at a
service step (e.g., subsided symptoms after treatment of a health condition). The variance
represents the idiosyncratic, emotional and experiential part of the customer value. It can
be interaction/moment-specific, and it determines how customers perceive the functional
benefit V ei during a particular interaction instance. For example, a patient who received
a successful treatment may still assess the overall service less favorably if he feels he was
rushed by the doctor. We refer the reader to Berry et al. (2002) for a more detailed
description of these two factors.
Let the functional part at each step i be V Pi ≥ 0 when the step is performed by the
provider and V Ci ≥ 0 when the step is delegated to the customer. The value of V Pi depends
on the provider’s expertise and capability to perform the specific step. Similarly, the value
of V Ci depends on the customer’s capability to perform the specific step.
2 As an example,
the value V CRegistration is larger for a technologically savvy customer who can efficiently use
an online registration system than for a customer who is less acquainted with the use of
technology. The difference ∆Vi
.
= V Pi − V Ci between the functional components at each
step characterizes the provider’s expertise advantage over the customer (i.e., the added
functional value that the provider contributes by controlling step i). Although the standard
expectation would be that ∆Vi > 0, as this justifies the need for a service provider in the
first place, one could think of service steps where ∆Vi < 0. This can be the case when, all
else being equal, the customer is better, or more efficient, at executing the task at hand
than the service provider. For instance, explaining seating preferences to an agent may
2 The value of V Ci may also be limited by the extent to which existing technology can facilitate customers in self-
performing a service step. For instance, self-checkout machines at grocery stores are known to have several shortcom-
ings (The Wall Street Journal 2013). Advances in retail automation aim at addressing such shortcomings (The Wall
Street Journal 2016).
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take more time than self-selecting seats directly through an automated terminal. At such a
step, the provider’s role is rather administrative than value-adding or expertise-based. This
description also captures manifestations of the “IKEA effect,” which postulates that some
customers may value more the creations for which they exerted more effort; see Norton
et al. (2012). Such a higher valuation of the service outcome may also be attributed to the
enhanced control that customers perceive when they perform a service task independently
(Dabholkar 1991, 1996, Bitner et al. 2000).
Regarding the idiosyncratic component ε˜e of the customer value, we assume that each
customer-provider interaction varies with respect to its exact value realization and we
capture this variance through σ2e . In fact, we posit that the same customer may enjoy a
different dining experience at a specific restaurant even if every time that he visits, he is
served by the same waiter, sits at the same table, and consumes the same food at the same
time of the day. This “noise” is a unique characteristic of service environments. It arises
from the fact that customers are an integral part of the service delivery process (Sampson
and Froehle 2006).
To vividly illustrate the roles of V ei and σ
2
e in our model, consider the following setup: a
patient seeks diagnosis and treatment. Let us assume that the patient is currently at the
Registration step. For a healthcare provider, contemplate the following two design scenar-
ios: i) the patient is supposed to self-check-in and self-report his symptoms and medical
history by filling out a set of appropriate forms, or ii) specialized personnel (e.g., a nurse)
are responsible for the patient’s registration. In the latter case, the presence of a nurse
ensures that registration happens in a smooth and timely fashion without unnecessary
trial-and-error attempts (e.g., fields missing from the registration form). In our model ter-
minology, this case corresponds to an expertise advantage from the healthcare provider
through a higher functional benefit, i.e., V NurseRegistration >V
Patient
Registration.
In the event that a nurse controls the registration, the idiosyncratic component of the
experience can add or subtract to the realized customer value. For instance, depending on
the medical condition a patient may perceive the presence of a nurse as intrusive, and for
that reason, he may feel uncomfortable to share details of his medical history and symptoms
(V˜ NurseRegistration < V
Nurse
Registration). On the other hand, it may also be possible that the patient
considers the nurse helpful, friendly, and/or reassuring, and thus finds it easier to provide
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the necessary information (V˜ NurseRegistration > V
Nurse
Registration). Since the patient’s self-registration
experience is not affected by the nurse, it is reasonable to assume that σ2Patient <σ
2
Nurse.
We assume that the magnitude of σ2e depends on the nature of the service. For instance,
routine services, where the valuation of the service outcome must conform to standardized
specifications (e.g., the time to receive the order in a fast food restaurant), are character-
ized by smaller values of variability than non-routine services where the service outcome is
evaluated along more intangible dimensions (e.g., space ambience, or attitude of the waiter
in a gourmet restaurant). We consider σC = δσP , with δ > 0 and ∆σ
.
= σP −σC = (1− δ)σP .
We characterize non-routine services by ∆σ > 0, (i.e., 0< δ < 1), implying that the idiosyn-
cratic component of the customer value is more variable at the steps controlled by the
provider (due to more interacting parts; i.e., more sources of experiential variability or
social frictions). For routine services, we consider ∆σ < 0, (i.e., δ > 1), implying that the
idiosyncratic component of the customer value is less variable at the steps controlled by the
provider. Hence, in routine services the provider maintains a variability “advantage” over
the customers whereas, in non-routine services, she maintains a variability “disadvantage.”
The distinct values of ∆Vi and ∆σ allow us a useful classification of different ser-
vices. Higher (lower) values of ∆Vi imply an expertise advantage (disadvantage) from the
provider. Lower (higher) values of ∆σ imply more (less) routine services. In that regard, our
model outlines design guidelines contingent on different service contexts. Figure 1 provides
examples of service steps in the ∆Vi×∆σ space under different service contexts.
Finally, the service steps may generate interdependent, complex effects on the value
realization at a specific step. This may be due to the nature of the service tasks or the
mere fact that the customer’s experience at one step may be biased due to the experience
at another step. For instance, a less courteous greeter at a restaurant may adversely affect
the customer’s interaction with the waiter. Therefore, we consider the realizations of the
values V˜ ei across the respective steps of the service process to be interdependent through
a common pairwise correlation ρ∈ (0,1).3
3 From a technical point of view, we consider an n×n correlation matrix P with ρi,j = ρ ∈ (0,1) ∀i 6= j and ρi,j = 1
∀i= j. P is a valid correlation matrix if and only if it is positive semidefinite. It is straightforward to show that the
determinants |P|> 0 and |Pk|> 0, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, where Pk is the principal submatrix that comprises only the 1
to k rows and columns of P. Hence, P is positive definite and as such represents a valid correlation matrix (see also
Rousseeuw and Molenberghs 1994).
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Figure 1 Service steps in the ∆Vi×∆σ space.
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Note. The provider’s expertise advantage is characterized by ∆Vi
.
= V Pi − V Ci ∀i ∈ J . The type of the service is
characterized by ∆σ
.
= σP −σC = (1− δ)σP , where δ ∈ (0,1) for non-routine services and δ > 1 for routine services.
3.2. Service Design Decisions
The service provider makes the irreversible decision of which steps to control/delegate to
the customers and also sets the price for the service. The customers observe the provider’s
choices and determine whether receiving the service is beneficial to them. We continue by
formulating the customer’s decision.
3.3. The Customer’s Decision
The overall value that customers derive from going through the entire ser-
vice process is a random variable V˜ (D) = ∑i∈P (V Pi + ε˜P ) + ∑i∈C (V Ci + ε˜C), with
mean V (D) = ∑i∈P V Pi + ∑i∈C V Ci , and variance σ2 (D) = ∑i∈P σ2P + ∑i∈C σ2C +
ρ
∑∑
i 6=j∈J
(
1i∈PσP + (1−1i∈P)σC
)(
1j∈CσC + (1−1j∈C)σP
)
.4
Regardless of the specific design D, customers are directly involved during service deliv-
ery as they provide the necessary input (e.g., information about symptoms, samples for
lab work, etc; see Sampson and Froehle 2006). Given this “personal” involvement, we
assume that customers are risk averse in that they prefer less variable and more uniform
service experiences. We utilize the mean-variance utility formulation (Markowitz 1952) to
express the customer’s expected utility as E
[
U
(
V (D) )] = E[V˜ ]− r
2
V ar
[
V˜
]
= V (D)−
r
2
σ2 (D) where U (·) is a concave increasing utility function and r > 0 is customers’ measure
of risk aversion (Varian 1992). Accordingly, the expected consumer surplus is given by
4 The indicator function 1i∈P = 1 if step i is controlled by the provider and 1i∈P = 0 if it is controlled by the customer.
Similarly, 1j∈C = 1 if step j is controlled by the customer and 1j∈C = 0 if it is controlled by the provider.
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E
[
U
(
V (D) , p)] = E[V˜ ]− r
2
V ar
[
V˜
]
− p = V (D)− r
2
σ2 (D)− p. Table 1 summarizes the
notation used throughout the paper.
Table 1 Notation, i∈J = {1,2, . . . , n}.
Parameters Symbol Definition
n Total number of service steps.
V Pi Functional benefit when the provider controls step i.
V Ci ≶ V Pi Functional benefit when the customer controls step i.
σ2P Variance of the experience when the provider controls a step.
σ2C
.
= (δσP )
2
Variance of the experience when the customer controls a step.
δ Relative variance.
ρ Correlation of the experiences at the different service steps.
r Customer’s risk aversion.
ci Provider’s marginal cost of performing step i.
Decision Variables Symbol Definition
p Price for the service.
D= (P,C) Service design.
P ⊆J Set of steps controlled by the provider.
C =J \P Set of steps delegated to the customer.
Without loss of generality, we normalize the price that the customers are willing to
pay when D = (∅,J ) to zero. Hence, customers deem the service beneficial if and only if
their expected surplus E
[
U
(
V (D) , p)] exceeds the surplus E[U(V (D= (∅,J ) ), p= 0)]=
V
(
(∅,J ) )− r
2
σ2
(
(∅,J ) ) which they expect to enjoy from self-performing the entire service.
3.4. The Service Provider’s Design Decisions
We formulate the service provider’s design problem under two settings: i) the benchmark
setting of full information and ii) a setting of asymmetric information. In the full informa-
tion case, the customers’ capabilities to perform the service steps are fairly homogeneous
(i.e., all customers have similar capabilities) and known to the service provider (i.e., the
service provider can observe or estimate these capabilities). In the asymmetric information
case, customers differ with respect to their capabilities and the provider cannot directly
observe them. The service provider determines the design D= (P,C). Given that C =J \P,
by determining the optimal P the provider also determines the optimal C. Hence, in the
rest of the paper, we refer to P as the main design decision in addition to the price p
charged for the service.
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In the full information case, the provider serves a homogeneous (in customer capabilities)
market by designing a single service. The optimal service design is based on:
maximize
P⊆J ,p≥0
Π (P, p) =
(
p−
∑
i∈P
ciV
P
i
)
M
s.t. E [U (P, p)]≥E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)]
In the provider’s profit function, M indicates the size of the market, which we normalize
to one without loss of generality, and ci ∈ (0,1) represents the marginal cost (per unit of
V Pi ) of controlling service step i. The total cost that the provider incurs from controlling
step i is ciV
P
i , which captures the fact that steps of higher service value/quality are also
more expensive to provide. For ease of exposition, we normalize to zero the cost that the
provider incurs when a service step is controlled by the customer (i.e., ci = 0 for all i∈ C).
Our cost structure aims to capture the cost savings that the provider enjoys by delegating
service steps to the customers. Hence, fixed costs incurred independent of whether a service
step is controlled by the provider or the customer (e.g., purchase of cooking equipment,
rental of service facility) are also normalized to zero. It could be argued that such costs
can be amortized over the cost ciV
P
i that the provider incurs when controlling a step i.
In practice, controlling a larger part of the service process may impose additional fixed
costs or capacity considerations to the provider. For instance, it may be necessary to hire
additional servers who are paid over a certain time period regardless of their workload.
Our model implicitly assumes a capacity scheduling flexibility and “distributes” such fixed
costs over the additional value that a customer derives when the provider controls a service
step. Such considerations point to operational aspects of service design, which, however,
fall outside the scope of this study. We believe that a more detailed treatment of these
issues in the context of allocating customer control of the service process is a promising
direction for future research.
In the asymmetric information case, the provider serves a heterogeneous (in customer
capabilities) market by designing a service line as opposed to a single service. We con-
sider customers to be differentiated with respect to their average capability to perform
the different service steps. The average step capability of a θ-type customer is V¯ C (θ) =∑n
i=1 V
C
i (θ)/n, where any θ1 > θ0 implies V¯
C (θ1) > V¯
C (θ0) and V
C
i (θ1) > V
C
i (θ0) for
any step i ∈ J . We assume that the different customer types are uniformly distributed
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according to V¯ C (θ)∼U [0, V¯ P ], where V¯ P =∑ni=1 V Pi /n. Hence, we formulate the case of
information asymmetry by using the average quantities V¯ P , V¯ C , and c¯, in the place of V Pi ,
V Ci , and ci, respectively and we focus on the meaningful case where the average marginal
benefit that the provider can derive is positive (i.e.,
(
V¯ P − V¯ C)− c¯V¯ P > 0).
The provider offers two services: D0 = (p0,P0) and D1 = (p1,P1) targeting the lower and
higher end of the market, respectively. The optimal service line design is based on:
maximize
P1,P0⊆J ,p1,p0≥0
Π (P1,P0, p1, p0) =
(
p0−
∑
i∈P0
c¯V¯ P
)
M0 +
(
p1−
∑
i∈P1
c¯V¯ P
)
M1
s.t M0 (P0,P1, p0, p1) .=
V¯ C
(
θˆ0
)
V¯ P
> 0
M1 (P0,P1, p0, p1) .=
V¯ C
(
θˆ1
)
− V¯ C
(
θˆ0
)
V¯ P
> 0
M0 (P0,P1, p0, p1) +M1 (P0,P1, p0, p1)≤ 1,
where V¯ C
(
θˆ0
)
.
=
{
V¯ C (θ) :E [U (P0, p0)]−E [U (P1, p1)] = 0
}
is the average capabil-
ity of the customer who is indifferent between the two services and V¯ C
(
θˆ1
)
.
={
V¯ C (θ) :E [U (P1, p1)]−E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)] = 0
}
is the average capability of the customer
who is indifferent between receiving the service (p1,P1) from the provider and self-
performing it.
By determining the optimal prices p0, p1, and sets of steps P0, P1, the provider determines
the optimal market segmentation (i.e., the number of customers M0 and M1 to receive each
service). Our formulation can extend to service lines comprising multiple (i.e., more than
two) service offerings. We focus on two offerings, which allows us to capture the essence of
the design trade-offs that the provider faces when serving a heterogeneous customer base
and at the same time to maintain expositional parsimony.
4. Analysis and Results
In this section, we analyze the service provider’s optimal design decisions. In §4.1 we focus
on the case of full information where customers’ capabilities to perform the service steps
are homogeneous and known to the provider. In §4.2 we extend our analysis to the case of
asymmetric information where customers’ capabilities are heterogeneous and unknown to
the service provider. All proofs and analytical expressions are relegated to the Appendix.
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4.1. Service Design under Full Information
The service provider determines the set of steps P for which she assumes responsibility and
the price p. With respect to pricing, for any P, the service provider chooses the maximum
price p¯ (P) (see Appendix) for which customers deem the service beneficial.
With respect to the design configuration, let F indicate the power set of J . There are
2n elements in F among which the provider chooses the P∗ ⊆F that maximizes her profit.
The fact that the service steps are heterogeneous (i.e., they have different V Pi , V
C
i , and/or
ci), implies that each step’s contribution to the provider’s profit differs. We define Ai
.
=(
V Pi −V Ci
)− ciV Pi as the expertise-based marginal benefit that the provider derives when
she controls step i ∈ J . The first term, V Pi − V Ci , of Ai captures the marginal functional
value added due to the provider’s expertise advantage whereas, the second term, ciV
P
i ,
captures the marginal cost incurred from controlling step i. Our first proposition describes
the priority rule the provider follows to determine which steps to control. We use k ∈ [0, n]
to denote the cardinality of P.
Lemma 1. (Optimal Design: The Choice Rule) To determine which service steps
to control, the provider sorts all steps in the decreasing order of their marginal benefit Ai,
∀i ∈ J . Let A[j] indicate the jth element of this ordering. The optimal partitioning of the
service steps is P = {[1] , [2] , . . . , [j] : j = k∗} and C =J \P, where k∗ ∈ [0, n].
Lemma 1 outlines a practical policy, which is based on an intuitive economic foundation:
the marginal benefit that the service provider can derive from each step. The provider
prioritizes the steps that offer higher marginal benefit. This benefit is determined by the
extent to which the provider’s expertise advantage V Pi − V Ci at a service step outweighs
the cost ciV
P
i of the step. Hence, this choice policy reflects the joint effect of V
P
i , V
C
i , and
ci on the provider’s decision regarding which steps to control.
5
Although Lemma 1 outlines how the provider should prioritize which steps to control, it
does not characterize the actual design, that is, how many steps of this priority ordering
she optimally selects. To this end, the next finding determines the cardinality k∗ of P∗.
For tractability, we approximate k ∈ [0, n] to be a continuous variable6 and we assume that
5 In its most general form Ai
.
=
( (
V Pi −V Ci
)− ciV Pi )M − Fi, our choice rule can capture cases where controlling a
step i imposes an incremental fixed cost Fi to the provider.
6 In the Appendix, we show that the provider’s profit is “well-behaved” (i.e., continuous and concave) in k. Hence,
the optimal discrete number of steps can be determined by approximating k∗ ∈ [0, n] to the closest integer dk∗e or
bk∗c that results in higher profit.
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A (k) = A[1] − A[1]−A[n]n k, where A[1] and A[n] is the maximum and minimum value of Ai,
respectively. To capture a wide range of services, in the rest of the paper we assume that
A[1] > 0 and A[n] ≤ 0 regardless of the service context. In other words, we consider settings
where the provider does not have an a priori advantage for all possible steps.
Lemma 2. (Optimal Design: The Number of Steps) The optimal number of steps
controlled by the provider is k∗ = max
{
min
{
n
(
2A[1]−(1−δ)rσ2P
(
1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ
))
2
(
A[1]−A[n]+(1−δ)2nρrσ2P
) , n} ,0}. All
else being equal, a service provider controls at least as many steps in routine as in non-
routine services.
Lemma 2 draws a significant managerial implication for service designs. Ceteris paribus,
services that are primarily conformance quality-orientated (i.e., routine services) require
more control from the provider than non-routine services. Said differently, designers should
think of routine services as “blocks” of steps that need to be managed holistically. Instead,
non-routine services should be focused on the “core provision.” The reason is that in routine
services more control always benefits the customers because it results in greater cumulative
functional value and more consistent experience. In non-routine services, the same level of
provider involvement possibly increases the overall variability of the customer experience
and limits the eventual value to the customer.
We should note that our model does not assume a relationship between expertise and
variability advantage. In practice, there may be service settings where the provider’s exper-
tise is a proxy for her ability to manage variability. For instance, a provider of high expertise
may be able to offer a consistent service all the time. In such cases, the provider optimally
controls a larger number of steps k∗ under both routine and non-routine services.
We have also assumed that customers prefer less variable and more consistent service
experiences. In cases where customers exhibit high tolerance or even favor experiential
variability (e.g., they prefer to have different experiences every time they visit a service
facility) the provider would control a larger number of steps under non-routine and a
smaller number under routine services. Our analysis has deliberately stayed away from
confounding effects between the functional and idiosyncratic parts of the customer value
in order to delineate them in a clean fashion.
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Corollary 1. (Optimal Design: Holistic vs. Focused Control) In non-routine
services, the provider may choose to delegate steps for which she is more capable of per-
forming than the customer and at which she would derive a positive marginal benefit. In
routine services, the provider may control steps for which she is less capable of performing
than the customers and at which she derives a negative marginal benefit.
Through the control of a step in a non-routine service, the provider contributes to the
customer value with the added functional value she provides. But at the same time, she
also increases the variability of the overall customer experience. The provider balances
this trade-off by optimally controlling steps for which she maintains a sufficient expertise
advantage over the customers. This does not imply that the provider controls all steps for
which V Pi >V
C
i . Rather, the provider controls only k
∗ of the steps with positive marginal
benefit A (k)> 0 (see Figure 2a). In contrast, in routine services, the provider always finds
it optimal to control more steps than simply the ones with A (k)> 0, hence, steps with a
negative marginal benefit A (k)< 0 (see Figure 2b). This implies that the provider controls
steps where she holds lower expertise than the customers (i.e., V Pi < V
C
i ). Yet, from the
customer’s point of view, such expertise disadvantage is offset by the reliability benefit
ensured due to the provider’s control.
Figure 2 Optimal number of steps controlled with respect to the marginal benefit derived by the provider.
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Note. A[1] and A[n] denote the maximum and minimum value of the marginal benefit Ai
.
=
(
V Pi −V Ci
) − ciV Pi ,
respectively. The area
∫ k∗
0
A (k)dk represents the total benefit the provider derives when she controls k∗ ∈ [0, n] steps.
In the next finding, we describe how the different characteristics of the service process
affect the provider’s decision regarding how many service steps to control. In particular,
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we consider the effect of process length n and the interdependency ρ of the different service
steps. We focus on the cases with k∗ ∈ (0, n), as in extreme design solutions (i.e., k∗ = 0 or
k∗ = n) such local perturbations leave the design mostly the same and bear little insight.
Proposition 1. (Process Characteristics: Length and Step Interdependen-
cies) For non-routine services: ∂k∗/∂n > 0 iff n < nˆ, and ∂k∗/∂ρ < 0 iff σ2P < σˆ
2
P1
. For
routine services: ∂k∗/∂n> 0, and ∂k∗/∂ρ> 0 iff σ2P < σˆ
2
P2
.
Proposition 1 prescribes that in routine services, the provider controls a bigger part of
services that comprise a larger number of steps (larger n; see Figure 3b), or processes with
more interdependent steps (larger ρ). The reason is that all else being equal, the length
and interdependencies of the service process amplify the variability of the overall customer
experience. Thus, the provider increases her control over the process steps to extract more
consumer surplus, as the customers benefit more from her ability to deliver the service
reliably. When considering the interdependencies of the steps though, beyond a level of
variability the provider does not increase k∗ because the levels of variability render the
option of self-performing the service less appealing to the customers. Hence, the provider
can limit her control to enjoy the related cost savings, and still have the customers deem
the service beneficial.
In contrast to routine services, in non-routine services the provider increases her control
only when the length (captured by the number of steps) of the process is contained (see
Figure 3a). Otherwise, the added functional value fails to outweigh the losses in customer
utility due to the higher overall variability. Furthermore, the provider assumes limited
control in processes with highly interdependent tasks. Larger ρ implies that the adverse
effect of variability becomes more pronounced as negative experiences at different steps can
cascade more impactfully throughout the entire service process. Hence, controlling more
steps implies an exponentially larger number of interdependencies. The provider mitigates
this effect by limiting k∗. Once more, the result illustrated in Figure 3a resonates with the
overarching message of our analysis: the design of non-routine services must carefully focus
on a subset of high-marginal benefit steps.
Next, we characterize the effect of process heterogeneity on the optimal service design.
A service process is heterogeneous when the functional value is primarily offered through
a small number of steps and homogeneous when all steps contribute similar functional
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Figure 3 Optimal number of steps k∗ with respect to the total number of steps n of the service.
0 5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
n
k
*
(a) Non-routine services (∆σ > 0 with δ= 0.5)
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
n
k
*
(b) Routine services (∆σ < 0 with δ= 1.5)
Note. We calculate k∗ using r= 0.45, A[1] = 2.25, A[n] =−1.5, ρ= 0.4, and σ2P = 1.66.
value. We address this comparison to understand how the distribution of value within a
service process plays any role in shaping the optimal design. In this way, we can answer the
question of whether designs should differ when the majority of the value comes from a few
core service steps. In order to make the comparison “unbiased,” we restrict the total benefit
that the provider can derive by controlling the entire service to be the same and equal to
A[1]+A[n]
2
n, under both a homogeneous and a heterogeneous process. Their difference is that
for the heterogeneous service process J we consider A (k) = A[1] − A[1]−A[n]n k, whereas for
the equivalent homogeneous process |J | we consider A (k) = A[1]+A[n]
2
for all k ∈ [0, n] (see
Figure 4a). We derive and compare the optimal number of steps k∗ (J ) and k∗ (|J |) that
the provider controls in a heterogeneous and homogeneous service process, respectively
along with the resulting profits Π∗ (J ) and Π∗ (|J |) .
Proposition 2. (Process Characteristics: Step Heterogeneity) In non-
routine services, the provider controls k∗ (J )< k∗ (|J |) iff A[1] > Aˆ[1]. In routine services,
the provider controls k∗ (J ) < k∗ (|J |) iff A[1] > A˜[1], where A˜[1] < Aˆ[1]. Regardless of the
type of the service, the provider always derives larger profit under a heterogeneous process,
i.e., Π∗ (J )>Π∗ (|J |).
For the same number of steps k ∈ (0, n), a homogeneous process limits the total benefit
that the provider can derive (see Figure 4b). This is because in a heterogeneous process the
provider can prioritize her control and choose the more beneficial steps. For that reason,
the provider’s profit is always higher under a heterogeneous than a homogeneous process.
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Figure 4 Heterogeneous versus homogeneous service process.
Heterogeneous service process
Homogeneous service process
0
0 n/2 n k
A[n]
A[1]
A[1] + A[n]
2
A(k)
(a) Marginal benefit A (k)
Homogeneous service
Heterogeneous service
0 5 10 15 20
0
5
10
15
20
k
 0k A(
x)ⅆx
(b) Total benefit
∫ k
0
A (x)dx
Note. The total benefit that the provider can extract
∫ n
0
A (k)dk is the same for both service processes. The total
benefit
∫ k
0
A (x)dx is calculated using n= 20, A[1] = 2.25, and A[n] = 0.
Although the provider’s profit is always higher under a heterogeneous service process, the
extent of the control under either process depends on the extent of her maximum expertise
advantage. We find that for larger values of expertise advantage, the provider exercises more
control in homogeneous processes. Interestingly, for smaller levels of expertise advantage,
the provider controls more steps when the service process is heterogeneous.
A heterogeneous distribution of functional value across the steps would naturally push
the service provider to focus on the fewer steps where she holds the largest expertise
advantage. Yet, for the same k ∈ (0, n), a homogeneous process bounds from both above
and below the marginal benefit that the provider can extract. Hence, the provider offers the
service only if it comprises a sufficient number of steps for which she maintains an expertise
advantage over the customers. The larger the number of such potential steps, the higher
the number of steps the provider controls. After a certain point, the incremental benefit of
controlling an additional step is larger in a homogeneous than in a heterogeneous process.
For that reason, for smaller A[1] the provider controls more steps in a heterogeneous process.
The counterintuitive nature of this result points out our earlier call for understanding the
relative capability of the provider and the customer in order to carefully assess the marginal
benefit of the service steps.
The above result holds true regardless of whether the service is routine or non-routine
(see Figure 5). The only difference is that in routine services, the range of A[1] values where
the provider exercises more control in heterogeneous processes is smaller. Hence, in routine
services, the provider tends to control more steps in homogeneous processes.
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Figure 5 The optimal number of steps k∗ controlled by the provider for homogeneous and heterogeneous service
processes.
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Note. We calculate k∗ using n= 20, r= 0.45, A[n] =−4, ρ= 0.4, and σ2P = 0.8.
4.2. Service Design under Information Asymmetry
In this section, we extend our analysis to the case of asymmetric information: customers’
capabilities are heterogeneous and unknown to the service provider. As we discussed in
§3, customers are differentiated with respect to their average capability to perform the
different service steps. Our next finding describes the effect of such heterogeneity in cus-
tomer capability on the provider’s profitability. In particular, we compare the provider’s
optimal profit under a heterogeneous market where the different types of customers θ are
distributed according to V¯ C (θ)∼U [0, V¯ P ], with the optimal profit under a homogeneous
market where all customers have the same type |θ| and V¯ C (|θ|) = V¯ P/2. Thus, the cus-
tomers of the homogeneous market have the same capability as the “average” customer of
the heterogeneous market.
Proposition 3. (The Effect of Customer Heterogeneity) In non-routine ser-
vices, customer heterogeneity results in higher (lower) profit for larger (smaller) values of
experiential variability, i.e., Π∗ (θ)−Π∗ (|θ|)> 0 iff σ2P > σ¯2P . In routine services, customer
heterogeneity results in higher (lower) profit for smaller (larger) values of variability, i.e.,
Π∗ (θ)−Π∗ (|θ|)> 0 iff σ2P < σ¯2P .
Customer heterogeneity implies an information asymmetry since the provider cannot
know (and it would be too costly to infer) the exact “type” (i.e., capability) of each
customer in the market. This means that, unlike the case of a homogeneous market, when
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the customers are heterogeneous, the provider fails to extract the entire consumer surplus
through a single service offering. Hence, it is reasonable to expect customer heterogeneity
to affect the provider’s profit negatively.
Proposition 3 shows that this is not necessarily true. Customer heterogeneity moderates
the negative effect of variability on the provider’s profitability. In non-routine services,
the provider’s profit decreases in σ2P regardless of whether the market is homogeneous
or heterogeneous (see Figure 6a). This is because in the face of larger variability, risk
averse customers opt out of undertaking the service and as a result, the provider decreases
the price she charges (see Figure 6c) or limits her control, which reduces her profit. This
decrease, however, is less detrimental when the market is heterogeneous as the provider is
able to focus on a smaller and less capable part of the market (i.e., she is able to segment
the market), which affords her to retain her pricing or even charge a higher price. Although
this segmentation allows for a pricing advantage, and as an extension, margin advantage,
it limits the number of customers receiving the service creating a volume disadvantage.
For that reason, when the variability is smaller, the provider derives higher profit in a
homogeneous than a heterogeneous market (see Figure 6a) as she can charge a high price
and still attract a large number of customers (see Figure 6b).
Figure 6 Optimal profit Π∗, price p∗ and market coverage M∗ of non-routine services under a heterogeneous
(V¯ C (θ)∼U [0, V¯ P ]) versus a homogeneous (V¯ C (|θ|) = V¯ P /2) market.
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Note. We calculate Π∗, p∗, and M∗ using δ= 0.75, n= 7, r= 0.75, V¯ P = 10, c¯= 0.1 and ρ= 0.3.
In routine services, we observe the opposite behavior. The fact that the provider can per-
form the service more reliably than the customers implies that larger values of σ2P increase
the provider’s variability advantage (we remind the reader that in routine services δ > 1
and ∆σ
.
= σP −σC = (1− δ)σP < 0). This allows her to charge higher prices (see Figure 7c)
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and still attract enough customers regardless of whether they have the same or different
capabilities. In the case of a heterogeneous market, larger values of σ2P enable the provider
to also increase her market coverage (see Figure 7b). Doing so implies that the provider
reaches out to the higher end of the market (i.e., to the high-capability customers). This,
however, limits the extent to which she can increase the price she charges. All else being
equal, a more capable customer is willing to pay a smaller price than a less capable cus-
tomer to receive the service from the provider. Hence, for larger values of variability the
provider benefits more from offering a routine service in a homogeneous than in a hetero-
geneous market. The reverse is true as the provider’s variability advantage decreases (i.e.,
for smaller values of σ2P ). In this case, the provider derives higher profit in a heterogeneous
market (see Figure 7a) because she can focus on the less capable customers.
Figure 7 Optimal profit Π∗, price p∗ and market coverage M∗ of routine services under a heterogeneous (V¯ C (θ)∼
U [0, V¯ P ]) versus a homogeneous (V¯ C (|θ|) = V¯ P /2) market.
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Note. We calculate Π∗, p∗, and M∗ using δ= 2, n= 7, r= 0.75, V¯ P = 10, c¯= 0.1 and ρ= 0.3.
Service Line Design. Varying capability levels among the customers may present an
opportunity for the provider to offer multiple services that are better tailored to the needs of
the different customers. In what follows, we characterize the economic benefit of providing
multiple services. We do so by comparing the optimal profit Π∗line (θ) of a service line that
comprises two different services with the optimal profit Π∗ (θ) of a single service.
Proposition 4. (The Economic Benefit of Service Lines) When customers are
heterogeneous in their capabilities, ∆Π = Π∗line (θ)−Π∗ (θ)> 0. The economic benefit ∆Π
exhibits an inverted “U-shaped” relationship with respect to the length n of the service pro-
cess. In non-routine services, ∂∆Π/∂n> 0 iff n∈ (0, n¯) and in routine services ∂∆Π/∂n>
0 iff n ∈ (0, n¯). All else being equal, the process length at which the benefit of offering a
service line is maximized, is larger in non-routine than in routine services, i.e., n¯ > n¯.
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Intuitively, Proposition 4 suggests that in the presence of customer heterogeneity, the
provider always derives higher profit by offering a service line. This is because a service line
facilitates better market segmentation and enables the provider to extract higher consumer
surplus. Proposition 4 however, points to the non-monotonic relationship between the
economic benefit of offering a service line and the length of the service process. We find
that a service line is more profitable for intermediate lengths. This is true for both routine
and non-routine services (see Figure 8). In non-routine services, we have already discussed
in Proposition 1 that for smaller or larger values of n, the provider optimally limits the
control of the service (ultimately k∗→ 0; see Figure 3a). This also extends to the case of
service lines. On the contrary, in routine services, we have seen that for larger values of n,
the provider optimally controls larger part of the service (see Figure 3b), which ultimately
leads to controlling the entire service process (i.e., k∗→ n). This implies that for a larger
number of steps, the extent to which the provider differentiates the designs of the two
services decreases because she is bounded by the total number of steps n that she can
control. It also explains why in routine services, the benefit of offering a service line is more
pronounced at smaller values of n.
Figure 8 The economic benefit ∆Π∗ of offering a service line (i.e., two services) versus a single service in a
heterogeneous market.
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Note. We calculate ∆Π∗ = Π∗ (service line)−Π∗ (single service) using σ2P = 1.5, r= 0.75, V¯ P = 10, c¯= 0.1 and ρ= 0.3.
The non-monotonic behavior captured in Proposition 4 implies that the decision to offer
a line of services might be more involved. This is especially true in the case when the design
and deployment of a service line entail additional costs. We elaborate on Corollary 2.
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Corollary 2. (The Economic Benefit of Service Lines) In the presence of
deployment costs, offering a service line may be economically justified only for service
processes of certain length.
Research on service management (Zeithaml et al. 1985) has identified one of the main
differences between products and services to be the fact that services are simultaneously
produced and consumed. For that reason, they cannot be inventoried. From a practical
point of view, this implies that although the different variants of a line of products can be
manufactured and subsequently sold by using the same pool of resources (e.g., the same
production facility), this may not be true with service lines. That is, the provider may not
be able to enjoy economies of scope (e.g., see Krishnan and Zhu 2006) because a service line
may entail deployment costs (e.g., acquiring new facilities/equipment, hiring and training
of personnel, monitoring costs), which can dampen the benefit (e.g., better segmentation)
of offering more than one service. Hence, depending on the magnitude of these costs, the
provider may prefer to design a service line only when the benefit (over serving the market
through a single service) of doing so is maximum. As we have discussed in Proposition 4,
this happens at intermediate values of process length (see Figure 8).
With this finding, our paper complements existing research on product line design (see
Krishnan and Gupta 2001, Krishnan and Zhu 2006, Lacourbe et al. 2009 and references
therein) by extending the focus of design to service lines. We do so by accounting for
factors that are typically not present or considered to be design levers at any stage of the
new product development process. For instance, products are typically designed around
tangible specifications and features and do not require significant customer involvement
during their production or delivery. On the contrary, services are intangible, they unfold
over multiple interdependent service steps, and the decision to involve (or not) the customer
at each of these steps can affect the overall customer experience.
The Effect of Competition on Service Design. Customer heterogeneity presents
opportunities to the service provider to offer multiple services in order to cover customer
needs better. In practice, this may also happen through different competing services. That
is, the presence of heterogeneity in customers’ capabilities may allow for the existence of
multiple services offered by competing providers. In what follows we examine how compe-
tition affects service design. We consider two providers, H and L, who differ along their
capability V¯ P , where V¯ PH > V¯
P
L . We assume that the customers’ capabilities are uniformly
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distributed according to V¯ C (θ)∼ U [0, V¯ PH ]. Although the modeling setup is structurally
similar to the one we used to capture the case of a single provider offering two services,
the fact that the two competing providers simultaneously design their services presents
analytical challenges in the derivation of the optimal designs. In the Appendix, we provide
the optimality conditions that determine the competing designs. Subsequently, we resort to
numerical methods that allow us to fully characterize the resulting designs. We summarize
our insights below.
Observation 1. (Service Design Under Competition) In the presence of com-
petition, the high-capability provider serves the more capable customers whereas the low-
capability provider serves the less capable customers. The low-capability provider controls
more steps under a competitive than a monopolistic setting. On the contrary, the high-
capability provider decreases her control under a competitive setting and assumes respon-
sibility for fewer service steps than the low-capability provider.
We find that for both routine and non-routine services, providers with competing offer-
ings can coexist in a heterogeneous market. However, competition seems to force a clearer
separation between the service designs adopted by the competing providers. The providers
set their designs with opposite goals: i) a higher-end “focused service” where the provider’s
control of the service process is minimal and ii) a lower-end “super-service” where the
provider controls the larger subset of the steps. In Figure 9 we see that for both routine
and non-routine services, it is the high-capability provider who optimally chooses to limit
her control and offer a focused service to the more capable customers. The less capable
customers are “efficiently” served by the low-capability provider who can compensate for
her lower expertise by controlling more service steps. For the same number of steps, the
high-capability provider would incur a higher cost than the low-capability provider. For
that reason, she chooses to serve the high-capability customers who are naturally capable
to perform a larger part of the service themselves. Although the high-capability provider
exercises minimal control, she extracts enough consumer surplus through the larger func-
tional value she provides due to her higher expertise. This ordering also holds true for
routine services. The low-capability provider does not have an incentive to cover the entire
market because she can charge higher prices when serving the less capable customers.
She does so by controlling the entire service as she maintains both an expertise and a
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variability advantage over the customers. Hence, the high-capability provider serves the
remaining (i.e., higher-end) part of the market. However, to differentiate from the low-
capability provider and to limit her cost, she controls only a part of the service process.
These insights reveal the effects of competition on service design that are not discerned by
our previous findings.
Figure 9 Optimal number of steps k∗H and k
∗
L controlled under competition by a high- and low-capability provider,
respectively.
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(a) Non-routine services (∆σ > 0 with δ= 0.4)
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(b) Routine services (∆σ < 0 with δ= 1.4)
Note. For the high-capability provider we use V¯ PH = 6 whereas, for the low-capability provider we use V¯
P
L = [3,5.75].
We also use n= 10, r= 1, σ2P = 1, c¯= 0.3, and ρ= 0.6.
5. Discussion
Customer participation in service contexts has been traditionally seen through the lens
of the operational cost savings it can entail. Through a variety of examples, however, we
recognize innovative providers who determine whether a service task should be controlled
by the customer or the service firm, as a means of shaping the overall customer experience.
Motivated by these service practices, we develop a stylized analytical framework to
answer the following question: under what conditions should providers grant control of
different parts of their service blueprint to the customers? We consider services as pro-
cesses comprising multiple interdependent steps. The experiences that customers derive
at the different steps can be coupled. We distinguish between routine services where the
customer appreciation of the service outcome stems from the adherence to standardized
specifications, and non-routine services where the service outcome is evaluated along more
subjective dimensions by the customer. Finally, we account for the possibility that the
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provider might design a service line. Our analysis generates the following insights not
identified by previous research.
We characterize a step choice rule that bears a clear, intuitive economic foundation.
Moreover, it lends itself to a guiding principle that providers and service designers can
use to determine which service steps to control. According to this rule, managers should
assign a higher priority to service steps that offer a higher marginal benefit. This benefit
is determined by the relationship between the provider’s expertise advantage at a service
step and the total cost of controlling the step. Characterizing this relationship rests upon
the thorough diligence of service designers to capture and comprehend how much more
advantageous is a provider compared to the customer in performing service tasks. Methods
like empathic design (Leonard and Rayport 1997) and design thinking (Brown 2008) can
offer inroads towards such know-how.
The extent of the provider’s control, however, differs significantly depending on the type
of the service. For instance, we find that ceteris paribus the provider exercises greater con-
trol in routine services than in non-routine ones. In routine services, the provider controls
steps from which she derives even a negative marginal benefit whereas, in non-routine
services, she might forego steps with positive marginal benefit. This implies that routine
services should be managed holistically as “blocks” of steps and that in non-routine ser-
vices providers should focus on the provision of steps that manifest their core expertise.
In routine services, lengthier service blueprints incentivize the provider to increase the
number of steps she controls. The opposite is true in non-routine services. We also find
that the number of service steps controlled by the provider may change with the extent
of interdependencies between the different steps; the direction of the effect rests upon the
relative variability that the provider introduces into the service system. Still, our insights
come with a cautious statement captured by the term ceteris paribus. The amount of con-
trol that the provider should exert by design does not rest solely on the type of the service,
but it is moderated by her expertise advantage.
Our conceptualization of the customer experience and the different service elements
observed in practice gives form to a useful classification of services. This classification is
based on the provider’s expertise advantage ∆Vi and the type of the service ∆σ as we
have already illustrated in Figure 1. To establish how the optimal design rests upon the
joint effect of the provider’s expertise advantage and the type of the service, consider
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the following services: i) the lab testing process for routine blood panels (e.g., lipoprotein
analyses), ii) the dining service at a theme restaurant, iii) the dining service at a gourmet
restaurant, and iv) the lab testing process for a condition of sensitive and private nature
(e.g., screening for sexually transmitted diseases).
We can approximately map these services to different points on a replica of Figure 1 (i.e.,
Figure 10; see points A-D). Lab testing may require a relatively small expertise advantage
because of advances in technology (e.g., it may be relatively easy for customers to draw their
own sample by using a provided test kit). However, due to fear of embarrassment/social
judgment or privacy concerns, customers may consider testing for conditions of sensitive
nature (point C) to be more experiential than testing of routine blood work (point A). As
we can see in Figure 10, the optimal number of steps that the provider controls at point
A is smaller than at point C. This is consistent with practices of providers like myLabBox
who delegate more steps of the service to the customers than providers who focus on more
routine blood testing.
Figure 10 The interaction of expertise advantage (A[1]) and service type (∆σ).
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Note. For a given A[n] and n, larger values of A[1] imply that the service comprises more steps where the provider has
an expertise advantage over the customer (i.e., more steps with A (k)> 0 and ∆Vi = V
P
i −V Ci > 0). We also remind
the reader that ∆σ
.
= σP − σC = (1− δ)σP , where δ > 1 for routine services and δ ∈ (0,1) for non-routine services.
We calculate k∗ using n= 20, r= 0.45, A[n] =−1.5, and ρ= 0.4.
Along similar lines, dining at a theme restaurant (point B; e.g., Hard Rock Cafe) and
dining at a gourmet restaurant (point D; e.g., a French restaurant) can be considered
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non-routine services (or in relative terms, less routine than dining at more casual estab-
lishments) because in both cases, customers may factor in the valuation of the service
intangible aspects such as the space ambience, or the employee behavior. Although both
services are non-routine, Figure 10 indicates that a gourmet restaurant may allow cus-
tomers to control a smaller part of the service than a theme restaurant. The reason is
that offering such a service entails higher expertise advantage (e.g., knowledge about best
combinations of food ingredients, or cooking preparations). This is consistent with known
practices of upscale restaurants which restrict customer engagement in their service deliv-
ery (Chowhound 2011).
Based on Figure 10, we also see that the optimal service design cannot be based solely
on the provider’s expertise advantage or the type of the service. Interestingly, the extent
of the provider’s control may be the same for services as different as dining at a gourmet
restaurant and having routine blood tests. Said differently, the provider’s control is not
simply the result of a larger expertise advantage or a specific service type. It is the inter-
action of these two dimensions that determines the optimal design. Although conventional
wisdom would likely indicate that providers should adopt a full-service approach mainly
for services that are non-routine and for which they have high expertise, Figure 10 shows
that providers may assume the same (or even more; e.g., consider any point on the left of
point A) control of more “prosaic” services.
With respect to the economic aspect of the optimal service design, we find that that
services where the steps differ significantly in terms of the provider’s expertise or the
customers’ ability to perform them are always the most profitable. What is more interesting
though, is the fact that higher profit does not translate into more control. Depending on
the level of expertise more or fewer service steps might be controlled.
Our paper provides some grounding insights into the design of service lines. Although
offering a service line always facilitates better market segmentation, it may not always be
economically profitable to do so. This is because deploying a service line may introduce
costs (e.g., cost of new facilities/equipment or hiring and training of employees) that stem
from the fact that services cannot be inventoried. From a profitability point of view, a
service line holds more promise for service processes of intermediate length. For smaller
or larger services we find that the economic benefit of introducing a service line is less
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pronounced. Finally, we characterize an important insight regarding the role of competi-
tion in service design. In particular, we find that competition incentivizes low-capability
providers to gravitate towards more control and offer a “super-service” whereas, more
capable providers reduce the number of steps they control and provide a “focused service”
that targets the high-capability customers.
To obtain first-order insights, our model was developed on the basis of a few simplify-
ing assumptions. Relaxing these assumptions presents opportunities for future research.
For instance, future work can focus on more involved cost structures that account for
economies of scale, capacity/workforce allocation, congestion effects, or increased rework
due to customer involvement. It was also assumed that customers are fully informed about
the provider’s overall capability. Evaluating whether a provider’s control allocation strategy
can credibly signal her capability can also provide insights not generated by our model.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.The service provider determines the optimal design based on
maximize
P⊆J ,p≥0
Π (P, p) =
(
p−
∑
i∈P
ciV
P
i
)
M
s.t. E [U (P, p)]≥E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)] .
The participation constraint can be rewritten as
E [U (P, p)]≥E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)]⇔
V (P)− r
2
σ2 (P)− p≥ V (∅)− r
2
σ2 (∅)⇔
p≤ V (P)−V (∅)− r
2
(
σ2 (P)−σ2 (∅) ),
where V (P) =∑i∈P V Pi +∑i∈C V Ci and V (∅) =∑i∈J V Ci .
Using k to denote the cardinality of P, the variance σ2 (P) can be calculated as
σ2 (P) = V ar
[∑
i∈P
V˜ Pi +
∑
i∈C
V˜ Ci
]
= kσ2P + (n− k)σ2C + 2ρ
(
k!
2! (k− 2)!σ
2
P +
(n− k)!
2! (n− k− 2)!σ
2
C + k (n− k)σCσP
)
= k
(
1 + (k− 1)ρ)σ2P + (n− k) (1 + (n− k− 1)ρ)σ2C + 2k (n− k)ρσCσP ,
where σC
.
= δσP . Similarly, σ
2 (∅) = n (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2C or σ2 (∅) = n (1 + (n− 1)ρ) δ2σ2P .
We start by deriving the optimal price for a given P and then we determine the optimal
set of steps controlled by the provider. The profit Π (P, p) is linear increasing in p. Hence,
for a given P, the optimal price is
p˜= V (P)−V (∅)− r
2
(
σ2 (P)−σ2 (∅) )
=
∑
i∈P
(
V Pi −V Ci
)− 1
2
(
kr (1− δ)
)(
1 + (k− 1)ρ+ δ(1 + (2n− 1− k)ρ)).
Define Π˜ (P) .= Π (P, p= p˜) = ∑i∈P Ai − 12(kr (1− δ))(1 + (k− 1)ρ + δ(1 +
(2n− 1− k)ρ)), where Ai .= (V Pi −V Ci ) − ciV Pi . The service provider determines the
optimal set of steps to control based on
maximize
P
Π˜ (P) =
∑
i∈P
Ai− 1
2
(
kr (1− δ)
)(
1 + (k− 1)ρ+ δ(1 + (2n− 1− k)ρ)).
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We now use an exchange argument to show that the service steps should be assigned in
decreasing order of Ai for i∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let A[j] indicate the jth element of that ordering.
Assume that the service provider decides to control k steps. Additionally assume that the
provider can use two different configurations (out of the n!
(n−k)! possible configurations) for
the choice of the service steps. In the first configuration, the service steps are chosen in a
decreasing order of A[i] such that A[j−1] ≥A[j], i.e., P1 =
{
A[1],A[2], . . . ,A[k−1],A[k]
}
. In the
second configuration, the service steps are chosen such that A[j−1] ≥A[j] ≥A[j+w], for any
w ∈ {1, . . . , n−k−1}, i.e., P2 =
{
A[1],A[2], . . . ,A[k−1],A[k+w]
}
. It is straightforward to show
that Π (P2)−Π (P1) =A[k+w]−A[k] ≤ 0. Since this holds for any w, it proves the claim that
the provider’s optimal decision is to choose to control the set of steps P1.
Proof of Lemma 2. We assume that the provider’s marginal benefit is described by
A (k) = A[1] −
(
A[1]−A[n]
)
k/n, where k ∈ [0, n], A[1] > 0 and A[n] ≤ 0. We can restate the
provider’s profit as
Π˜ (k) =
∫ k
0
A (x)dx− 1
2
(
kr (1− δ)
)(
1 + (k− 1)ρ+ δ(1 + (2n− 1− k)ρ)).
It is straightforward to calculate
∫ k
0
A (x)dx=A[1]k− A[1]−A[n]2n k2. The provider determines
the optimal number of steps k∗ she controls based on
maximize
0≤k≤n
Π˜ (k) =A[1]k−
A[1]−A[n]
2n
k2− 1
2
(
kr (1− δ)
)(
1+(k− 1)ρ+δ(1+(2n− 1− k)ρ)).
Π˜ (k) is concave in k because ∂
2Π˜(k)
∂2k
= −(A[1]−A[n]+nr(1−δ)
2ρσ2P )
n
< 0. Hence, the solution of
∂Π˜ (k)/∂k = 0 offers the unconstrained maximizer kunc =
n
(
2A[1]−(1−δ)rσ2P
(
1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ
))
2
(
A[1]−A[n]+(1−δ)2nρrσ2P
) ,
and k∗ = max{min{kunc, n} ,0}. After differentiating kunc we obtain
∂kunc/∂A[1] =
n
(
r
(
1− δ)(1 + (1− ρ) δ+ (2n− 1)ρ)σ2P − 2A[n])
2
(
A[1]−A[n] +nrσ2P (1− δ)2 ρ
)2
∂kunc/∂A[n] =
n
(
2A[1]−r(1−δ)
(
1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ
)
σ2P
)
2
(
A[1]−A[n]+nrσ2P (1−δ)2ρ
)2 .
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)): ∂kunc/∂A[1] > 0 and kunc − n =
n(2A[n]−r(1−δ)(1+δ+(2n−1−δ)ρ)σ2P )
2
(
A[1]−A[n]+nrσ2P (1−δ)2ρ
) < 0 for any A[1] > 0. Hence, kunc ∈ (0, n) iff A[1] > A¯[1] .={
A[1] : kunc = 0
}
=
(
r (1− δ) (1− ρ+ δ+ (2n− 1)δρ)σ2P
)
/2> 0 otherwise, k∗ = 0.
• For routine services (i.e., for ∆σ < 0; δ > 1): ∂kunc/∂A[n] > 0 and kunc > 0 for any
A[1] > 0, A[n] ≤ 0. Hence, kunc < n iff A[n] < A¯[n] .=
{
A[n] : kunc = n
}
= r
(
1 − δ)(1 +
(1− ρ) δ+ (2n− 1)ρ)σ2P/2< 0.
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At σ2P = 0, the difference kunc (δ1)− kunc (δ2) = 0. Furthermore, ∂(kunc(δ1)−kunc(δ2))∂σ2P < 0 (ana-
lytical expression available upon request) for any σ2P . Hence, kunc (δ1)− kunc (δ2)< 0 (i.e.,
kunc (δ2)>kunc (δ1)) always.
Proof of Corollary 1. Define kˆ
.
= {k :A (k) = 0} = nA[1]
A[1]+A[n]
. Based on that we derive
kˆ − kunc = nA[1]A[1]+A[n] −
n
(
2A[1](1−δ)rσ2P
(
1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ
))
2
(
A[1]−A[n]+(1−δ)2nρrσ2P
) . At σ2P = 0, the difference kˆ − kunc =
0. Furthermore,
∂(kˆ−kunc)
∂σ2P
=
nr(1−δ)(A[1](1+(1−ρ)δ+(2n−1)ρ)−A[n](1+δ−ρ+(2n−1)δρ))
2(A[1]−A[n]+nrρ(1−δ)2σ2P )
2 for which it is
straightforward to show that
∂(kˆ−kunc)
∂σ2P
> 0 for all δ ∈ (0,1) and ∂(kˆ−kunc)
∂σ2P
< 0 for all δ > 1.
Hence, kunc < kˆ for non-routine and kˆ < kunc for routine services.
Proof of Proposition 1. With respect to the comparative statics of the optimal number
of steps we focus on the cases where k∗ = kunc as in extreme design solutions (i.e., k∗ = 0 or
k∗ = n) any local perturbations leave the design unaffected and bear little insight. Doing
so we obtain
∂k∗/∂n=
(1−δ)ρrσ2P (A[1]−A[n])(1−δ(4n−1))+(A[1]−A[n])(2A[1]−(1−δ2)rσ2P )−2δ(1−δ)3(nρrσ2P )
2
2(A[1]−A[n]+(1−δ)2nρrσ2P )
2
∂k∗/∂ρ=
(1−δ)nrσ2P (−A[1](2n−δ−1)+A[n](δ(2n−1)−1)+(1+δ)(1−δ)2nrσ2P )
2(A[1]−A[n]+(1−δ)2nρrσ2P )
2 .
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)): ∂k∗/∂n > 0 iff n < nˆ .=
− A[1]−A[n]
rσ2P ρ(1−δ)2
+
√
(A[1]−A[n])(2(A[1]−δA[n])−rσ2P (1−δ)2(1+δ)(1−ρ))
2σ2P (r(1−δ)2δρ)
2 , and ∂k∗/∂ρ< 0 iff σ2P < σˆ
2
P1
.
=
A[1](2n−1−δ)+A[n](1−δ(2n−1))
nr(1−δ)2(1+δ) .
• For routine services (i.e., when ∆σ < 0; δ > 1): ∂k∗/∂n > 0, and ∂k∗/∂ρ > 0 iff σ2P <
σˆ2P2
.
=
A[1](2n−1−δ)+A[n](1−δ(2n−1))
nr(1−δ)2(1+δ) .
Proof of Proposition 2. We adopt the notation k∗ (|J |) and Π∗ (|J |) to indicate the
optimal number of steps and the optimal profit, when the service process is homogeneous
with A (k) =
A[1]+A[n]
2
. For a heterogeneous process we use the notation k∗ (J ) and Π∗ (J ).
Similar to the proof of Lemma 2 we derive kunc (|J |) =
A[1]+A[n]−r(1−δ)σ2P
(
1+δ+
(
δ(2n−1)−1
)
ρ
)
2rρ(1−δ)2σ2P
.
Then,
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)): kunc (|J |) ∈ (0, n) iff A[1] ∈(
2A¯[1]−A[n],2A¯[1]−A[n] + 2r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P
)
.
• For routine services (i.e., for ∆σ < 0; δ > 1): kunc (|J |) ∈ (0, n) iff A[n] ∈(
2A¯[n]−A[1]− 2r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P ,2A¯[n]−A[1]
)
.
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We focus on k∗ (|J |) ∈ (0, n), which also implies k∗ (J ) ∈ (0, n) because 2A¯[1] − A[n] +
2r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P > A¯[1] and 2A¯[n]−A[1] <A[n]. Based on k∗ (|J |) and p∗ (|J |) =
p˜ (k= k∗ (|J |)), we calculate the provider’s profit in a homogeneous process as
Π∗ (|J |) =
(
A[1] +A[n]− r (1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + δ+
(
δ(2n− 1)− 1)ρ))2
8rρ (1− δ)2 σ2P
.
The profit differential
Π∗ (|J |)−Π∗ (J ) =
(
A[1] +A[n]− r (1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + δ+
(
δ(2n− 1)− 1)ρ))2
8rρ (1− δ)2 σ2P
− n
(
2A[1]− r(1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + δ+
(
δ(2n− 1)− 1)ρ))2
8
(
A[1]−A[n] + (1− δ)2nρrσ2P
) < 0 for
A[1] ∈
(
2A¯[1]−A[n],2A¯[1]−A[n] + 2r
(
1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P ) when ∆σ > 0,
A[n] ∈
(
2A¯[n]−A[1]− 2r
(
1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P ,2A¯[n]−A[1]) when ∆σ < 0.
Furthermore, k∗ (|J |)− k∗ (J ) = (A[1]−A[n])(A[1]+A[n]−r(1−δ
2)σ2P (1+(n−1)ρ))
2(1−δ)2ρrσ2P (A[1]−A[n]+(1−δ)2nρrσ2P )
> 0 iff
A[1] > Aˆ[1]
.
=A[1] +A[n]− r
(
1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P when ∆σ > 0 (i.e., when δ ∈ (0,1)),
A[1] > A˜[1]
.
=A[1] +A[n]− r
(
1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P when ∆σ < 0 (i.e., when δ > 1).
It is straightforward to show that A˜[1] < Aˆ[1].
Proof of Proposition 3. In the remaining of the proofs we make use of the average
quantities V¯ P , V¯ C , c¯ and consider only the meaningful case of positive marginal benefit(
V¯ P − V¯ C)− c¯V¯ P > 0 (i.e., the average marginal benefit that the provider can derive is
positive). We capture a heterogeneous customer population by normalizing the total size
of the market to one and by assuming the different types of customers θ to be distributed
according to V¯ C (θ)∼ U [0, V¯ P ]. The marginal customer (θˆ) holds a capability V¯ C (θˆ) .={
V¯ C (θ) :E [U (P, p)]−E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)] = 0} is indifferent between receiving the service
from the provider and entirely self-performing it. The consumer surplus E [U (P, p)] −
E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)] decreases in V¯ C as ∂(E[U(P,p)]−E[U(P=∅,p=0)])
∂V¯ C
= −k < 0. Therefore, the
provider serves the market
M(p, k)
.
=
V¯ C
(
θˆ
)
V¯ P
= 1− p+
1
2
kr (1− δ) (1 + (k− 1)ρ+ δ (1− ρ+ (2n− k)ρ))σ2P
kV¯ P
.
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The provider’s maximization problem is given by
maximize
0≤k≤n,p≥0
Π =
(
p− kc¯V¯ P )M(p, k)
s.t 0≤M(p, k)≤ 1.
By differentiating Π, we obtain ∂2Π/∂2p = − 2
kV¯ P
< 0. Hence, solving ∂Π/∂p = 0 for p
returns the optimal price (for a given k)
p˜=
1
4
k
(
2 (1 + c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1− (k− 1)ρ− δ (1− ρ− (2n− k)ρ)))σ2P .
We define
Π˜ (k)
.
= Π (k, p= p˜) =
k
(
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P + r (1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + (k− 1)ρ+ δ(1 + (2n− 1− k)ρ)))2
16V¯ P
.
The provider maximizes Π˜ subject to 0≤ k≤ n and M˜ (k) .=M (p= p˜, k)∈ [0,1], where
M(p= p˜, k) =
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P + r (1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + (k− 1)ρ+ δ(1 + (2n− 1− k)ρ))
4V¯ P
.
The Lagrangean of the provider’s problem is given by
L= Π˜ +λ1 (n− k) +λ2k+λ3
(
1− M˜
)
+λ4M˜.
To determine the optimal design we identify the critical points that satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions: ∂L/∂k = 0, ∂L/∂λ1 ≥ 0, ∂L/∂λ2 ≥ 0, ∂L/∂λ3 ≥ 0, ∂L/∂λ4 ≥ 0, λ1∂L/∂λ1 = 0,
λ2∂L/∂λ2 = 0, λ3∂L/∂λ3 = 0, λ4∂L/∂λ4 = 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, and λ4 ≥ 0.
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)) we obtain:
i) When σ2P ∈
(
0, 2(1−c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1+(3n−1)ρ+δ−(n+1)δρ)
]
k∗ = n and Π∗ =
n
(
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P
)2
16V¯ P
.
ii) When σ2P ≥ 2(1−c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ) , k
∗ = 0 and Π∗ = 0.
iii) When σ2P ∈
(
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1+(3n−1)ρ+δ−(n+1)δρ) ,
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)
)
k∗ =
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1 + δ− ρ+ (2n− 1) δρ)σ2P
3r (1− δ)2 ρσ2P
∈ (0, n)
Π∗ =
(
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1 + δ− ρ+ (2n− 1) δρ))3
108rV¯ P (1− δ)2 ρσ2P
.
In this case, ∂2Π˜/∂2k
∣∣
k=k∗ =−
r(1−δ)2ρσ2P (2(1−c¯)V¯ P−r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)σ2P )
8V¯ P
< 0.
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• For routine services (i.e., for ∆σ < 0; δ > 1) we obtain: k∗ = n and Π∗ =
n(2(1−c¯)V¯ P−r(1−δ2)(1+(n−1)ρ)σ2P )
2
16V¯ P
for any σ2P .
In the case of a homogeneous market, we assume that all customers have the same type
|θ|. In particular, as we mention in the main paper, the customers of the homogeneous
market have the same capability V¯ C = V¯ P/2 as the “average” customer of the heteroge-
neous market (we also assume c¯ < 1/2 so that the marginal benefit (1/2− c¯) V¯ P > 0). The
provider’s problem can written as
maximize
0≤k≤n
Π˜ (k) =
k
2
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + (k− 1)ρ+ δ(1 + (2n− 1− k)ρ))) .
Following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 2 we obtain
kunc =
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − (1− δ)rσ2P
(
1− ρ+ δ+ (2n− 1)δρ))2
8(1− δ)2nρσ2P
Πunc (k= kunc; |θ|) =
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + δ+
(
δ(2n− 1)− 1)ρ))2
8rρ (1− δ)2 σ2P
.
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)):
i) When σ2p ≥ (1−2c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ) , k
∗ = 0, and Π∗ = 0.
ii) When σ2p ∈
(
0, (1−2c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1+(1−ρ)δ+(2n−1)ρ)
]
,
k∗ = n and Π∗ =
n
2
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P ) .
iii) When σ2P ∈
(
(1−2c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1+(1−ρ)δ+(2n−1)ρ) ,
(1−2c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)
)
, k∗ = kunc, Π∗ = Πunc.
• For routine services (i.e., for ∆σ < 0; δ > 1):
k∗ = n and Π∗ =
n
2
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P ) for any σ2P .
To establish the existence of a switching point before/after which the provider benefits
more from offering the service under a heterogeneous or homogenous market we compare
the corresponding profits.
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)) we focus in the region σ2P ∈(
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1+(3n−1)ρ+δ−(n+1)δρ) ,
(1−2c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)
)
where
— Under a heterogeneous market:
k∗ =
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1 + δ− ρ+ (2n− 1) δρ)σ2P
3r (1− δ)2 ρσ2P
∈ (0, n)
Π∗ =
(
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1 + δ− ρ+ (2n− 1) δρ))3
108rV¯ P (1− δ)2 ρσ2P
.
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— Under a homogeneous market:
k∗ (|θ|) =
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − (1− δ)rσ2P
(
1− ρ+ δ+ (2n− 1)δρ))2
8(1− δ)2nρσ2P
∈ (0, n)
Π∗ (|θ|) =
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ)σ2P
(
1 + δ+
(
δ(2n− 1)− 1)ρ))2
8rρ (1− δ)2 σ2P
.
Based on the above, we find that Π∗−Π∗ (|θ|)> 0 iff σ2P > 2(1−4c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1+δ−ρ+(2n−1)δρ)
.
= σ¯2P ,
where σ¯2P ∈
(
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1+(3n−1)ρ+δ−(n+1)δρ) ,
(1−2c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)
)
.
• For routine services (i.e., for ∆σ < 0; δ > 1) we compare
Π∗ =
n
(
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P
)2
16V¯ P
with
Π∗ (|θ|) = n
2
(
(1− 2c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ2) (1 + (n− 1)ρ)σ2P ) ,
and we find that Π∗−Π∗ (|θ|)> 0 iff σ2P <
2(1−
√
2+c¯)V¯ P
r(δ2−1)(1+(n−1)ρ)
.
= σ¯2P .
Proof of Proposition 4. We now consider the case where the provider designs a service
line comprising two services. In particular, the provider designs a service that targets the
lower end of the market by controlling k0 steps and charging p0, and a different service
that targets the higher end of the market by controlling k1 6= k0 steps and charging p1 6= p0.
The θˆ0 customer with a capability V¯
C
(
θˆ0
)
.
=
{
V¯ C (θ) :E [U (P0, p0)]−E [U (P1, p1)] = 0
}
is indifferent between the two services. Similarly, the θˆ1 customer with a capability
V¯ C
(
θˆ1
)
.
=
{
V¯ C (θ) :E [U (P1, p1)]−E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)] = 0
}
is indifferent between receiv-
ing the service from the provider and entirely self-performing it. The number of customers
that the provider serves through the (k0, p0) service is
M0(p0, k0, p1, k1)
.
=
V¯ C
(
θˆ0
)
V¯ P
= 1− p1− p0
(k1− k0) V¯ P
+
r (1− δ) (1 + (k0 + k1− 1)ρ+ δ (1 + (2n− k0− k1− 1)ρ))σ2P
2V¯ P
.
The number of customers served through the (k1, p1) service is
M1(p0, k0, p1, k1)
.
=
V¯ C
(
θˆ1
)
− V¯ C
(
θˆ0
)
V¯ P
=
2(k0p−kp0)
k21−k1k0 + rk0 (1− δ)
2 ρσ2P
2V¯ P
.
The provider’s maximization problem is given by
maximize
0≤k0,k1≤n,p0,p1≥0
Πline =
(
p0− k0c¯V¯ P
)
M0 +
(
p1− k1c¯V¯ P
)
M1
s.t M0 ≥ 0,M1 ≥ 0
M0 +M1 ≤ 1.
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By differentiating Πline, we obtain ∂
2Πline/∂
2p0 =
2
(k1−k0)V¯ P < 0 iff k1 < k0, ∂
2Πline/∂
2p1 =
2k0
(k1−k0)k1V¯ P < 0 iff k1 < k0, and ∂
2Πline/∂
2p0∂
2Πline/∂
2p1− (∂2Πline/∂p1∂p0)2 = 4k(k0−k1)V¯ P >
0 iff k1 <k0 (we show later that k
∗
1 <k
∗
0). Hence, solving ∂Πline/∂p0 = 0 and ∂Πline/∂p1 = 0
with respect to p0 and p1 returns the optimal prices (for given k0, k1)
p˜0 =
1
4
k0
(
2 (1 + c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1− (k0− 1)ρ− δ (1− ρ− (2n− k0)ρ))
)
σ2P
p˜1 =
1
4
k1
(
2 (1 + c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1− (k1− 1)ρ− δ (1− ρ− (2n− k1)ρ))
)
σ2P .
Based on p˜0, p˜1 we define Π˜line (k0, k1)
.
= Πline (k0, k1, p0 = p˜0, p1 = p˜1) (analytical expres-
sion available upon request). The provider maximizes Π˜line subject to 0 ≤ k0, k1 ≤ n,
M˜0 (k0, k1)
.
= M0 (k0, k1, p0 = p˜0, p1 = p˜1) ≥ 0, M˜1 (k0, k1) .= M1 (k0, k1, p0 = p˜0, p1 = p˜1) ≥ 0,
and M˜0 (k0, k1) + M˜1 (k0, k1)≤ 1. The Lagrangean of the provider’s problem is given by
Lline = Π˜line +λ1 (n− k0) +λ2k0 +λ3M˜0 +µ1 (n− k1) +µ2k1 +µ3M˜1 +ψ
(
1− M˜0− M˜1
)
.
We determine the optimal design by identifying the critical points that satisfy the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions: ∂Lline/∂k0 = 0, ∂Lline/∂k1 = 0, ∂Lline/∂λ1 ≥ 0, ∂Lline/∂λ2 ≥
0, ∂Lline/∂λ3 ≥ 0, ∂Lline/∂µ1 ≥ 0, ∂Lline/∂µ2 ≥ 0, ∂Lline/∂µ3 ≥ 0, ∂Lline/∂ψ ≥ 0,
λ1∂Lline/∂λ1 = 0, λ2∂Lline/∂λ2 = 0, λ3∂Lline/∂λ3 = 0, µ1∂Lline/∂µ1 = 0, µ2∂Lline/∂µ2 = 0,
µ3∂Lline/∂µ3 = 0, ψ∂Lline/∂ψ= 0, λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, µ1 ≥ 0, µ2 ≥ 0, µ3 ≥ 0, and ψ≥ 0.
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)):
i) When σ2P ∈
(
0, 2(1−c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(2(1−ρ+δ)−(n+2)δρ+5nρ)
]
, and k∗1 = n/2, k
∗
0 = n.
ii) When σ2P ∈
(
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(2(1−ρ+δ)−(n+2)δρ+5nρ) ,
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)
)
,
k∗1 =
2 (1− c¯) V¯ P − r (1− δ) (1− ρ+ δ+ (2n− 1) δρ)σ2P
5r (1− δ)2 ρσ2P
, and k∗0 = 2k
∗
1.
iii) When σ2P ≥ 2(1−c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ) , k
∗
1 = k
∗
0 = 0.
• For routine services (i.e., for ∆σ < 0; δ > 1):
i) When σ2P ∈
(
0, 2(1+c¯)V¯
P
r(δ−1)(2(1−ρ+δ)+nρ+(3n−2)δρ)
)
, k∗1 = n/2, and k
∗
0 = n.
ii) When σ2P ≥ 2(1+c¯)V¯
P
r(δ−1)(2(1−ρ+δ)+nρ+(3n−2)δρ)
k∗1 =
−2 (1 + c¯) V¯ P + r (δ− 1) (1− ρ+ δ+ (2n− 1) δρ)σ2P
r (1− δ)2 ρσ2P
, k∗0 = n and ψ > 0.
Bellos and Kavadias:
40 Customer Control and Service Design
For all cases, we verify sufficiency ∂2Π˜line/∂
2k0
∣∣
k0=k∗0 ,k1=k
∗
1
, ∂2Π˜line/∂
2k1
∣∣
k0=k∗0 ,k1=k
∗
1
<
0, and
(
∂2Π˜line/∂
2k0∂
2Π˜line/∂
2k1−
(
∂2Π˜line/∂k1∂k0
)2)∣∣∣
k0=k∗0 ,k1=k
∗
1
> 0 (analytical
expressions available upon request).
To determine the benefit of providing a line of two services over a single service we com-
pare the profitability of the optimal designs that the provider employs under the different
σ2P ranges we derived above and in the proof of Proposition 3.
• For non-routine services (i.e., for ∆σ > 0; δ ∈ (0,1)):
i) In the range of σ2P ∈
(
0, 2(1−c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1+(3n−1)ρ+δ−(n+1)δρ)
]
we compare the profits
Π˜line (k
∗
0 = n,k
∗
1 = n/2) and Π˜ (k
∗ = n).
ii) In the range of σ2P ∈
(
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1+(3n−1)ρ+δ−(n+1)δρ) ,
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(2(1−ρ+δ)−(n+2)δρ+5nρ)
)
we com-
pare Π˜line (k
∗
0 = n,k
∗
1 = n/2) and Π˜
(
k∗ = 2(1−c¯)V¯
P−r(1−δ)(1+δ−ρ+(2n−1)δρ)σ2P
3r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
)
.
iii) In the range of σ2P ∈
[
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(2(1−ρ+δ)−(n+2)δρ+5nρ) ,
2(1−c¯)V¯ P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)
)
we
compare the profits Π˜line
(
k∗0 = 2k
∗
1, k
∗
1 =
2(1−c¯)V¯ P−r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)σ2P
5r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
)
and
Π˜
(
k∗ = 2(1−c¯)V¯
P−r(1−δ)(1+δ−ρ+(2n−1)δρ)σ2P
3r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
)
.
It is easy to show that Π˜ (k∗0, k
∗
1)− Π˜ (k∗) > 0 for all σ2P ∈
(
0, 2(1−c¯)V¯
P
r(1−δ)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)
)
,
which implies that the provider always finds it optimal to offer a line
of two services over a single service. To determine how the magnitude
of this benefit changes with respect to the length n of the service pro-
cess, we calculate ∂
(
Π˜line (k
∗
0, k
∗
1)− Π˜ (k∗)
)
/∂n (analytical expression available
upon request) and we find that ∂
(
Π˜line (k
∗
0, k
∗
1)− Π˜ (k∗)
)
/∂n > 0 for all
n ∈ (0, n¯) and ∂
(
Π˜line (k
∗
0, k
∗
1)− Π˜ (k∗)
)
/∂n ≤ 0 for all n ≥ n¯, where n¯ =
2(9−δ)(2(1−c¯)V¯ P−r(1−δ2)(1−ρ)σ2P )
r(45−51δ−δ2+7δ3) .
• For routine services (i.e., for ∆σ < 0; δ > 1):
i) In the range of σ2P ∈
(
0, 2(1+c¯)V¯
P
r(δ−1)(2(1−ρ+δ)+nρ+(3n−2)δρ)
]
we compare the profits
Π˜line (k
∗
0 = n,k
∗
1 = n/2) and Π˜ (k
∗ = n).
ii) In the range of σ2P >
2(1+c¯)V¯ P
r(δ−1)(2(1−ρ+δ)+nρ+(3n−2)δρ) we compare the profits
Π˜line
(
k∗0 = n,k
∗
1 =
−2(1+c¯)V¯ P+r(δ−1)(1−ρ+δ+(2n−1)δρ)σ2P
r(1−δ)2ρσ2P
)
and Π˜ (k∗ = n).
In both cases, it is easy to show that Π˜line (k
∗
0, k
∗
1) − Π˜ (k∗) > 0 for any value
of σ2P . After differentiating Π˜line (k
∗
0, k
∗
1) − Π˜ (k∗) with respect to n, we obtain
∂
(
Π˜line (k
∗
0, k
∗
1)− Π˜ (k∗)
)
/∂n> 0 for all n∈ (0, n¯) and ∂
(
Π˜line (k
∗
0, k
∗
1)− Π˜ (k∗)
)
/∂n≤
0 for all n≥ n¯, where n¯= (1+3δ+
√
1+3δ2)(2(1+c¯)V¯ P−r(δ2−1)(1−ρ)σ2P )
6r(δ2−1)δρσ2P
.
Bellos and Kavadias:
Customer Control and Service Design 41
With respect to the service length thresholds, we obtain n¯
(
δ= δ¯
)− n¯(δ= δ¯)> 0, for any
δ¯ ∈ (0,1), and δ¯ > 1.
Observation 1. We consider two competitors, H and L, who differ along their capa-
bility V¯ P , where V¯ PH > V¯
P
L . We also consider customers to be uniformly distributed
according to V¯ C (θ) ∼ U [0, V¯ PH ]. The are two possible competitive “configurations:” i)
the high-capability provider serves the higher end whereas the low-capability provider
serves the lower end of the market or, ii) the high-capability provider serves the
lower end whereas the low-capability provider servers the higher end of the mar-
ket. The subsequent analysis reveals that competitive equilibria exist only when the
low-capability provider serves the lower-end of the market and the high-capability
provider serves the higher-end of the market; hence, we present only the formula-
tion of this competitive scenario. Specifically, in a competitive setting the θˆL customer
with a capability V¯ C
(
θˆL
)
.
=
{
V¯ C (θ) :E [U (PH , pH)]−E [U (PL, pL)] = 0
}
is indifferent
between the two providers. Similarly, the θˆH customer with a capability V¯
C
(
θˆH
)
.
={
V¯ C (θ) :E [U (PH , pH)]−E [U (P = ∅, p= 0)] = 0
}
is indifferent between receiving the ser-
vice from the high-capability provider and entirely self-performing it.
The number of customers that the low-capability provider serves through the (kL, pL)
service is
ML(pL, kL, pH , kH)
.
=
V¯ C
(
θˆL
)
V¯ P
=
pL− pH + kH V¯ PL − kLV¯ PH
kH − kL
− r
2
(1− δ) (1 + (kL + kH − 1)ρ+ δ (1 + (2n− kL− kH − 1)ρ))σ2P .
The number of customers served through the (kH , pH) service of the high-capability
provider is
MH(pL, kL, pH , kH)
.
=
V¯ C
(
θˆH
)
− V¯ C
(
θˆL
)
V¯ P
=
2(kLpH−kH(kH(V¯ PH −V¯ PL )−pL))
kH(kH−kL) + rkL (1− δ)
2 ρσ2P
2V¯ P
.
The maximization problem of the high-capability provider is given by maximize
0≤kH≤n,pH≥0
ΠH =(
pH − kH c¯V¯ PH
)
MH subject to MH ∈ [0,1]. Similarly, the low-capability provider solves
maximize
0≤kL≤n,pL≥0
ΠL =
(
pL− kLc¯V¯ PL
)
ML subject to ML ∈ [0,1].
As in Propositions 3 and 4, for given kL, kH we derive the prices:
p˜H =
kH(2(kL((2V¯ PH +V¯ PL )c¯+V¯ PH )−kH(2V¯ PH −V¯ PL ))+(1−δ)rσ2P (kL−kH)(−δ+ρ(δ−(1−δ)kH−δ(kL+2n)+kL+1)−1))
2(4kL−kH) ,
p˜L =
2k2H(V¯ PH −V¯ PL )+4k2L(V¯ PH +c¯V¯ PL )−2kHkL(2V¯ PL −c¯V¯ PH )−kL(kL−kH)r(1−δ)(δ(ρ(kH+2kL−4n+2)−2)+ρ(2−kH−2kL)−2)σ2P
2(4kL−kH) .
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After substituting in ΠH and ΠL we obtain:
Π˜H (kH ;kL) =
kLkH(2kH(V¯ PL −(2−c¯)V¯ PH )+2kL((1−2c¯)V¯ PH +c¯V¯ PL )−(kL−kH)(1−δ)(1+δ−(1+kL−kH(1−δ)+δ−(2n+kL)δ)ρ)σ2P )
2
4(4kL−kH)2(kL−kH)V¯ PH
,
Π˜L (kL;kH) =
(2(2k2L+c¯kLkH−k2H)V¯ PH +2(kH−2kL)(k+c¯kL)V PL +(kH−kL)kLr(1−δ)(2+(kH+2kL−2)ρ+δ(2+(4n−2kL−kH−2)ρ))σ2P )
2
4(4kL−kH)2(kL−kH)V¯ PH
.
The high-capability provider maximizes Π˜H (kH ;kL) subject to 0 ≤ kH ≤ n,
M˜H (kH ;kL)
.
= MH (kH , pH = p˜H , pL = p˜L;kL) ∈ [0,1] (analytical expression available upon
request) and the low-capability provider maximizes Π˜L (kL;kH) subject to 0 ≤ kL ≤ n,
M˜L (kL;kH)
.
= ML (kL, pL = p˜L, pH = p˜H ;kH) ∈ [0,1] (analytical expression available upon
request). To determine the competitive equilibria we need to simultaneously maximize the
profits of the two providers.
Similar to Proposition 4, the optimal designs are determined by the critical points that
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Given the analytical complexity of Π˜H (kH ;kL) and
Π˜L (kL;kH) we find the solutions to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions via numerical methods
and for different values of n, δ, r, σ2P , ρ, c¯, and V¯
P
H (e.g., see Figure 9 for an example
of such values used). The qualitative insights (see Figure 9) are not sensitive to different
value combinations for the service parameters.
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